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Stored object knowledge and the
production of referring expressions:
the case of color typicality
Hans Westerbeek*, Ruud Koolen and Alfons Maes
Tilburg Center for Cognition and Communication, Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands
When speakers describe objects with atypical properties, do they include these
properties in their referring expressions, even when that is not strictly required for
unique referent identification? Based on previous work, we predict that speakers
mention the color of a target object more often when the object is atypically colored,
compared to when it is typical. Taking literature from object recognition and visual
attention into account, we further hypothesize that this behavior is proportional to
the degree to which a color is atypical, and whether color is a highly diagnostic
feature in the referred-to object’s identity. We investigate these expectations in two
language production experiments, in which participants referred to target objects in
visual contexts. In Experiment 1, we find a strong effect of color typicality: less typical
colors for target objects predict higher proportions of referring expressions that include
color. In Experiment 2 we manipulated objects with more complex shapes, for which
color is less diagnostic, and we find that the color typicality effect is moderated by color
diagnosticity: it is strongest for high-color-diagnostic objects (i.e., objects with a simple
shape). These results suggest that the production of atypical color attributes results from
a contrast with stored knowledge, an effect which is stronger when color is more central
to object identification. Our findings offer evidence for models of reference production
that incorporate general object knowledge, in order to be able to capture these effects
of typicality on determining the content of referring expressions.
Keywords: reference production, color typicality, content determination, cognitive visual saliency, models of
reference production
Introduction
In everyday language use, speakers often refer to objects by describing what they see, in such a
way that an addressee can uniquely identify the intended object (e.g., Pechmann, 1989; Brennan
and Clark, 1996; Horton and Gerrig, 2005; Arnold, 2008; Van Deemter et al., 2012a). In Figure 1,
for example, a speaker can refer to the leftmost object by using the deﬁnite description “the yellow
tomato.” In this visual context this referring expression accommodates unambiguous identiﬁcation
by the addressee, as it describes the target object and rules out the other (distractor) objects. Note,
however, that a description like “the tomato” would also suﬃce as an unambiguous description
of the leftmost object, as there are no other tomatoes in the context. Then why would a speaker
mention the tomato’s color anyway?
A reason could be that the color of the yellow tomato in Figure 1 draws attention, because it
contrasts with one of the features in a stored representation of tomatoes in the speaker’s long-term
memory, namely the feature that tomatoes are typically red. This makes the color of the tomato
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FIGURE 1 | An example of a visual context, containing an atypically
colored object. Manipulations of color may not be visible in some print
versions of this paper.
cognitively salient. Cognitive salience is diﬀerent from physical
salience, which is visual salience caused by image-level
characteristics such as bright colors and strong contrasts (we
take the terms cognitive and physical salience from Landragin,
2004). As such, the tomato’s color may not be physically diﬀerent
from the color of the pineapple, but when cognitively processed
the color of the tomato is more conspicuous. As speakers
are inclined to mention object properties that capture their
attention or the attention of the addressee (e.g., Krahmer and
Van Deemter, 2012), the yellow tomato’s atypical color probably
causes the speaker to include this in the referring expression,
even though this property may not be strictly necessary for
unique identiﬁcation. If speakers are inﬂuenced by atypical
colors, that implies that speakers are sensitive to contrasts with
stored object knowledge when they determine the content of a
referring expression.
The question of content determination (i.e., which properties
of an object does a speaker include in a referring expression?) is
often addressed from both a psycholinguistic perspective and in
the ﬁeld of natural language generation (NLG). Psycholinguistics
provides models of content determination by human speakers
(e.g., Brennan and Clark, 1996; Engelhardt et al., 2011), for
example by addressing the question whether object properties
are mentioned merely because they are salient to the speakers
themselves, or also because these properties may be found
useful for the addressee, whose task it is to identify the
referred-to object (e.g., Brennan and Clark, 1996; Horton and
Keysar, 1996; Arnold, 2008). NLG models make comparable
predictions on content determination, as they often aim to
simulate human referring behavior (e.g., Dale and Reiter,
1995; Frank and Goodman, 2012; Krahmer and Van Deemter,
2012).
Models of reference, either implicitly or explicitly, describe
at least two (addressee-oriented and speaker-internal) types of
factors that speakers rely on when determining the content
of a referring expression. The ﬁrst is how informative an
object property is for addressees: when, for example, a property
is unique to an object in a context, this property is highly
informative with respect to the addressees’ task to identify the
target object, as it rules out all other objects in the context. As
such, informativeness can be regarded as a mainly addressee-
oriented factor in content determination. The other factor,
salience, is essentially more speaker-internal: speakers tend to
mention object properties that capture their visual attention
(e.g., Conklin and McDonald, 1982; Brennan and Clark, 1996;
Fukumura et al., 2010; Frank and Goodman, 2012; Krahmer
and Van Deemter, 2012). This is not to say that addressees
would not beneﬁt from object properties that are included in a
referring expression based on salience. Speakers’ decisions with
respect to content determination may reﬂect addressee-oriented
considerations as well (we will further elaborate on this in the
general discussion).
While both informativeness for addressees and salience for
speakers are part of current models of content determination
in reference production, speciﬁc extensions may be needed
to capture the potential eﬀects of atypicality on content
determination. Without such extensions, models of reference
would not predict that atypical colors are more salient to speakers
(and addressees), and thus would model referring expressions
that are identical despite diﬀerences in color atypicality.
To test how atypicality may aﬀect content determination, we
focus on atypical colors, and study deﬁnite descriptions produced
by speakers referring to typically and atypically colored objects.
Our hypotheses are: (1) A higher proportion of descriptions
will include the color of atypically colored objects, compared to
typically colored ones; (2) this proportion is correlated to the
degree to which a color is atypical for an object; and (3) this
proportion is higher when shape is less diagnostic for the identity
of an object. Our null hypothesis would be that speakers base
content determination on informativeness and physical salience,
and thus would not be sensitive to diﬀerences in atypicality of
target objects.
Theoretical Background
The cognitive processes that underly our predictions for eﬀects
of color atypicality on reference production are rooted in
the psychology of object recognition. Object recognition is
an integral part of speaker-internal processes in reference
production. When speakers refer to visually perceived objects,
such as the tomato in Figure 1, they must ﬁrst recognize and
identify this object as being a member of the category tomato.
Recognizing objects implies assessing a stored representation
of an object in long-term memory, which in turn yields
a phonological representation of the object’s name (e.g.,
Humphreys et al., 1988). This will then be realized as the head
noun of the referring expression. Stored knowledge of the typical
colors of objects plays a role in this process of object recognition
and naming.
That atypicality aﬀects object recognition follows from work
in experimental psychology (e.g., Tanaka and Presnell, 1999;
Tanaka et al., 2001; Therriault et al., 2009). In several studies,
it is shown that color plays a role in object recognition through
response latencies for example, as people are slower to recognize
and name objects that are atypically colored (e.g., Price and
Humphreys, 1989; Therriault et al., 2009), or through Stroop
tasks (Naor-Raz et al., 2003). These eﬀects are caused by the
fact that an atypical color cannot function as a useful cue for
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ﬁnding the corresponding mental representation of the object.
Also, atypically colored objects are visually salient and thus
likely attract attention in a scene (e.g., Becker et al., 2007).
These studies show that for (at least some) objects color is
part of an object’s representation in stored knowledge, and
that this is accessed when objects are recognized (see Tanaka
et al., 2001 and Bramão et al., 2011a, for comprehensive
reviews).
Not all objects are strongly tied to one or a few particular
colors. The degree to which a particular object is associated with
a speciﬁc color is called color diagnosticity (e.g., Tanaka and
Presnell, 1999). Objects that can have any color are called non-
color-diagnostic. The color of these objects is not predictable
from the object’s category (e.g., Sedivy, 2003; Bramão et al.,
2011a), as theys can have many diﬀerent colors (e.g., cars, pens).
Conversely, objects that do have one or a few prototypical colors
associated with them are called color-diagnostic objects (e.g.,
bananas, carrots), because color is diagnostic in determining their
identity, and can be predicted from the object’s category (e.g.,
Tanaka and Presnell, 1999; Bramão et al., 2011a,b).
To study eﬀects of atypicality, the focus is on color-diagnostic
objects, because the color of these objects can be more or less
like the prototypical color of the category the object belongs
to. As said, in stored knowledge, the mental representation of
such objects plausibly contains information about what their
typical color is (e.g., Naor-Raz et al., 2003). This information is
based on the color of objects in the same ontological category:
if many exemplars of an object have the same color, then this
color is prototypical of the object’s category (e.g., Rosch and
Mervis, 1975). This does not rule out that other colors are
possible too: Rosch’s (1975) Prototype Theory postulates that
one object exemplar can simply be a better representative of the
category than another. So, the exact color used is one factor that
determines how atypical a color is for an object: for example, blue
is very atypical for bananas, but green not so much.
Within the category of color-diagnostic objects, higher, and
lower color-diagnostic objects can be distinguished (e.g., Tanaka
and Presnell, 1999). For high color-diagnostic objects, color is an
important feature in determining their identity. Typical examples
of such objects are fruits: often a fruit’s shape is simple and similar
to other fruits (i.e., round with only a few protruding parts),
which makes color more diagnostic in identiﬁcation (e.g., Tanaka
et al., 2001). So, when other aspects of objects such as shape are
more characteristic, color is likely to be less instrumental in object
recognition (Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Mapelli and Behrmann,
1997; McRae et al., 2005; Bramão et al., 2011a, p. 245). Shape
diagnosticity is, for object recognition, a moderating factor in
the degree of association between an object and its typical and
atypical colors: once viewers have to recognize atypically colored
objects having a highly diagnostic shape, we may expect color
to be less crucial in the recognition of the object, as the process
will be informed more prominently by the diagnostic shape.
It may be assumed that manipulations of color typicality are
more conspicuous for objects with a relatively simple shape (e.g.,
lemons) than for complex-shaped objects (e.g., lobsters).
As color atypicality is important for object recognition (and
more so if objects have a low-diagnostic shape), and atypical
colors capture visual attention (Landragin, 2004; Becker et al.,
2007), what does that mean when speakers have to produce an
adequate referential expression for visually present objects? In
general, speakers are inclined to mention what captures their
visual attention in referring expressions, which may be useful
for addressees (e.g., Conklin and McDonald, 1982; Brennan
and Clark, 1996; Keysar et al., 1998; Fukumura et al., 2010;
Frank and Goodman, 2012; Krahmer and Van Deemter, 2012).
Hence, for physical salience, the link with content determination
is indeed well-established. For example, color contrast causes
speakers to mention color in their object descriptions (e.g.,
Viethen et al., 2012; Koolen et al., 2013). But what about cognitive
salience, and color (a)typicality in particular? We expect that the
cognitive salience associated with atypical colors also results in
color being a highly preferred attribute when speakers have to
produce adequate referential expressions for atypically colored
objects.
The idea that stored knowledge of typical colors of objects
plays a role in content determination gains support from
a production study by Sedivy (2003). Her work does not
involve atypical colors, but she investigated whether speakers
mention color in a referring expression dependent on the color
diagnosticity of the objects they describe. Participants gave
instructions to a conversational partner to move one of two
(typically) colored drawings of objects. In the experimental trials,
color was not necessary for helping the addressee to disambiguate
the target object from the other object, so mentioning color
would yield what is called an overspeciﬁed referring expression
(e.g., Pechmann, 1989; Koolen et al., 2011). The target objects
(i.e., those that were to be moved) were either color-diagnostic
(e.g., yellow bananas), or non-color-diagnostic (e.g., yellow cars).
Sedivy (2003) observed that for color-diagnostic objects, the
proportion of speakers that mentioned the (predictable) color of
such objects was roughly thirty percent lower than when objects
were not color-diagnostic. All objects in Sedivy’s experiment
were typically colored, and it is yet unclear whether colors
that contrast with stored knowledge will also make speakers
include color. Sedivy’s (2003) results, however, do suggest that
content determination is aﬀected by color information in object
knowledge, and that speaker’s decisions to encode color in a
referring expression are not taken independently of an object’s
type.
Participants in a study by Mitchell et al. (2013a) described
objects with atypical materials or shapes, where mentioning
these properties was necessary for the addressee to uniquely
identify the intended object. Although not dealing with color,
Mitchell et al.’s (2013a) study directly suggests that atypical
object properties are preferred over typical ones in content
determination. In their experiment, participants instructed a lab
assistant to move a number of objects on a table into positions
in a grid. Target objects could not be uniquely identiﬁed by
mentioning their type only, so participants had to include shape,
texture, or both in their referring expressions in order to be
unambiguous. Crucially, Mitchell et al. (2013a) manipulated
whether the shape of the object was atypical (e.g., a hexagonal
mug), or whether the material was atypical (e.g., a wooden
key), and using neither of those properties would result in an
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ambiguous referring expression. Thus, for unique identiﬁcation
of the target objects the speakers had to decide between
mentioning a typical property, an atypical one, or both. Speakers
turned out to prefer the atypical property over the typical one
signiﬁcantly more often than the other way around.
So, previous work on reference production in combination
with color diagnosticity and typicality shows that speakers
to mention atypical properties of objects when referring to
them. Nonetheless, there are some ways in which this work
can be extended, with respect to overspeciﬁcation, eﬀects of
color diagnosticity and typicality in object recognition, and the
speciﬁc use of color adjectives. Firstly, it is yet unclear whether
atypicality leads speakers to mention an atypical property that
is not needed to uniquely identify the target object, but will
yield an overspeciﬁed referring expression instead. In Mitchell
et al.’s (2013a) task, mentioning the atypical property always
disambiguated the target object from distractors, and as such
one can speculate that the preference of speakers for the atypical
property over the typical one may not only be due to the
atypicality per se, but also because speakers may have found the
atypical property somehow more informative or useful than the
typical alternative. Such decisions may be diﬀerent when the
atypical property is not needed to uniquely identify the object.
Secondly, Mitchell et al.’s (2013a) data does not provide insight
into a potential relationship between the degree of atypicality of
an object property and the probability that it is included in a
referring expression. It may be less straightforward to deﬁne a
degree of atypicality for a shape or material given some object,
but this is possible in the case of color typicality. Finally, we argue
that it is interesting to look speciﬁcally at color, because color is
often found to be one of the most salient properties of objects
and is realized in referring expressions more often than any
other property (e.g., Pechmann, 1989), also in more naturalistic
domains (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2013b).
The Current Experiments
To investigate how eﬀects of color atypicality in object
recognition may aﬀect content determination in reference
production, we test whether speakers redundantly include color
in a referring expression, and whether this is proportional to
the degree of (a)typicality of that color for the object that is
referred to. Following the object recognition literature, the degree
to which speciﬁc objects are associated with particular colors
theoretically depends on two factors. One factor is the degree
of color atypicality: Some colors are more atypical for an object
than other colors (e.g., blue bananas are more atypical than green
ones). The other factor is shape diagnosticity: manipulations
of color typicality are expected to be more conspicuous for
low-shape-diagnostic objects (e.g., lemons) than for high-shape
diagnostic ones (e.g., lobsters), because for the former type of
objects color may be less crucial in object recognition. Given the
integral role of object recognition in reference production, the
question is how these factors aﬀect the production of referring
expressions.
In two language production experiments, speakers view simple
visual contexts comprised of multiple typically and atypically
colored objects. The speakers are instructed to describe one of the
objects in such a way that a conversational partner can uniquely
identify this target object. The contexts are constructed as such
that color is never necessary for unique identiﬁcation. As such,
we keep the informativeness of color for the addressees’ task
to identify the intended referent equal across all conditions. So,
when speakers mention color, this is in a strict sense redundant.
In Experiment 1, we investigate how the degree of atypicality
of a color for the target object (on a continuum, established in
a pretest) aﬀects the proportion of descriptions including color.
We aim to maximize the diagnostic value of color by focusing on
objects with a low-diagnostic shape (e.g., Bramão et al., 2011a).
In Experiment 2, we compare typically and atypically colored
objects that have a shape that is more versus less diagnostic, in
order to address the second factor that is expected to moderate
color typicality. So, we investigate whether our ﬁndings from
the ﬁrst experiment extend to objects for which color itself
is a less central property, and whether shape diagnosticity
moderates speaker’s sensitivity to color atypicality in reference
production.
Experiment 1: Referring to Objects with
Colors of Different Degrees of Atypicality
Method
Participants
Forty-three undergraduates (eleven men, thirty-two women,
median age 21 years, range 18-25) participated for course credit.
The participants were native speakers of Dutch (the language of
the study). All gave consent to have their voice recorded during
the experiment. Their participation was approved by the ethical
committee of our department.
Materials Pretest
A pretest was conducted to determine the degree of atypicality
of objects in certain colors. Sixteen high-color-diagnostic objects
were selected on the basis of stimuli used in object recognition
studies (e.g., Naor-Raz et al., 2003; Therriault et al., 2009).
These objects were mainly fruits and vegetables, with simple
shapes. In terms of geons (cf., Biederman, 1987), they were
mainly comprised of one or two simple geometric components.
Such simple objects have an uncharacteristic shape, as shape is
relatively uninformative for distinguishing these objects from
other object categories (Tanaka et al., 2001). This makes color
more instrumental in object recognition (Bramão et al., 2011a).
For each of the objects a high quality photograph was obtained,
which was edited such that the object was on a plain white
background. Further photo editing was done to make a red,
blue, yellow, green, and orange version of each object. This
resulted in a set of eighty photos (16 object types in ﬁve
colors).
The photos were presented to forty participants in an on-line
judgment task (thirteen men, twenty-seven women, median age
22.5 years, range 19-54; none participated in any of the other
experiments and pretests in this paper). To manage the length
of this task, participants were randomly assigned to one of two
halves of the photo set. For each photo, participants ﬁrst had
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to type in the name of the object (“what object do you see
above?”) and the object’s color (“which color has the object?”).
Then, they answered the question “how characteristic is this
color for this object?” by using a slider control ranging from “is
not characteristic” to “is characteristic” (“niet kenmerkend,” “wel
kenmerkend” in Dutch). The position of the slider was linearly
converted to a typicality score ranging from 0 to 100, where
100 indicated that the color-object combination was judged
as most typical (i.e., the slider was placed in the rightmost
position). For each photograph, the typicality score was averaged
over participants in order to calculate a measure of color
typicality.
Materials
Based on the results of the pretest, fourteen objects were
selected for the experiment. Two objects were rejected because
typicality scores were low for all the colors tested, or because
many participants had diﬃculties naming the object (see the
supplementary materials for details). Furthermore, of each object
two colors were discarded, such that the ﬁnal set of objects
and colors would represent the whole spectrum of the typicality
ratings continuum obtained in the pretest (scores ranging from 2
to 98, from very atypical to very typical, plus scores in between).
As an illustration: the least typical objects were a blue bell pepper
and red lettuce, among the most typical ones were yellow cheese
and a red tomato. A yellow apple and a green tomato fell about
halfway in between the extremes.
The ﬁnal set of objects was used to construct forty-two
experimental visual contexts. Figure 2 presents three examples
of these contexts. Each context contained six diﬀerent objects,
positioned randomly in a three by two grid. The colors of these
objects were chosen such that there were three diﬀerent colors
in each context, with each color appearing on two objects. Also,
the typicality score averaged over the six objects in each context
was similar for all trials (the mean typicality score of each context
was between 40 and 60). One of the objects in each context
was the target object, which was marked with a black square
outline. The other ﬁve objects were the distractors. The target
object was always of a unique type in each context, so mentioning
the target object’s color was never necessary to disambiguate
the target from any of the distractors. Crucially, the 42 target
objects diﬀered in their degree of typicality, as established in the
pretest.
To ensure that the degree of color typicality of the target
object was not confounded with physical salience, we assessed
salience by using a computational perceptual salience estimation
algorithm (Erdem and Erdem, 2013). We did this because any
eﬀect of color atypicality on whether speakers mention color in
a referring expression should not be attributable to the object’s
color being more bright, contrasting, or otherwise physically
salient to the speaker. Crucially, the algorithm that we used does
not incorporate any general knowledge about objects and their
typical colors, as it only measures salience based on physical
(image-level) features.
We ran Erdem and Erdem’s (2013) algorithm on our 42
experimental visual contexts, using its standard settings and
parameters. The algorithm outputs physical salience scores for
each pixel of an image, which expresses the relative salience of
that pixel with respect to other pixels in the image. In our visual
contexts, six areas of interest (AOIs) were deﬁned, one for the
target object and ﬁve for the distractor objects. Of each AOI,
the mean relative salience of the pixels was calculated, which
expresses how salient the object in that AOI is compared to the
other AOIs (i.e., objects) in the context.
Analyses of the mean relative salience as determined by
the algorithm showed that there was no signiﬁcant correlation
between the degree of physical salience of the target object
in each scene and its color typicality, Pearson r(40) = 0.05,
p = 0.721. The atypically colored objects in our experiment were
physically not more salient than the typically colored ones (and
vice versa). Furthermore, a one-way analysis of variance with
color as the independent and salience as the dependent variable
showed no diﬀerences in salience for each of the ﬁve target colors,
F(4,41)= 1.05, p= 0.397.
In addition to the experimental contexts, we created 42
ﬁller contexts. These consisted of four hard-to-describe greebles
(Gauthier and Tarr, 1997), all purple, so that participants were
not primed with using color in the other trials. One greeble was
marked as the target object that had to be distinguished from the
distractors.
Procedure
Participants sat at a table facing the experimenter, with a
laptop in front of them. The participants were presented with
the 42 trials, one by one, on the laptop’s screen. Between
each experimental trial, there was a ﬁller trial. Participants
FIGURE 2 | Examples of visual contexts in Experiment 1. From left to right: a context with a highly typical target (red tomato; typicality score 97), one with a not
typical nor atypical target (yellow apple; typicality score 58), and one with an atypical target (blue pepper; typicality score 2).
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described the target objects in such a way that the experimenter
would be able to uniquely identify them in a paper booklet.
The instructions emphasized that it would not make sense
to include location information in the descriptions, as the
addressee would see the objects in a diﬀerent conﬁguration.
Participants could take as much time as needed to describe the
target, and their descriptions were recorded with a microphone.
The addressee (experimenter) never asked the participants
for clariﬁcation, so the data presented here are one-shot
references.
The procedure commenced with two practice trials: one with
six non-color-diagnostic objects in diﬀerent colors, and one
practice trial with greebles. Once the target was identiﬁed, this
was communicated to the participant, and the experimented
pressed a button to advance to the next trial. The trials were
presented in a ﬁxed random order (with one ﬁller after each
experimental trial). This order was reversed for half of the
participants, to counterbalance any potential order eﬀects. After
completion of the experiment, none of the participants indicated
that they had been aware of the goal of the study. The experiment
had an average running time of about 25 min.
Research Design and Data Analysis
For each of the experimental trials, we determined whether the
speakers’ description of the target object resulted in unambiguous
reference, which mainly implied annotating whether respondents
used the correct type attribute. Because the target object was
always of a unique type in each context, mentioning type
was suﬃcient. We also assessed whether the object’s type was
named correctly. Using the correct type was important, because
otherwise we could not deduce whether the object’s color was
regarded as typical or atypical. We annotated each description as
either containing a color adjective, or not.
Whether mentioning color was related to the degree of color
atypicality of the target object was analyzed using logit mixed
models (Jaeger, 2008). Initial analyses revealed that stimulus
order had no eﬀects, so this was left out in the following analyses.
In our model, color typicality (as scores on the pretest) was
included as a ﬁxed factor, standardized to reduce collinearity
and to increase comparability with Experiment 2. Participants
and target object types were included as random factors. The
model had a maximal random eﬀect structure: random intercepts
and random slopes were included for all within-participant and
within-item factors, to ensure optimal generalizability (Barr et al.,
2013). Speciﬁcally, the model contained random intercepts for
participants and target objects, and a random slope for color
typicality at the participant level.
Results and Discussion
The data of three participants was not analyzed because of
technical issues with the audio recordings. Of the remaining
1680 descriptions, 1629 descriptions (97%) were intelligible,
unambiguous, and contained a correct type attribute, resulting
in unique reference. As expected, practically all analyzed
descriptions were of the form “the tomato” or “the yellow
tomato.”
FIGURE 3 | Typicality scores of objects (horizontal axis) and the
proportion of descriptions of these objects that contain color (vertical
axis) in Experiment 1. Some illustrative objects are labeled in this plot; the
line represents the correlation between the two variables.
Figure 3 plots the atypicality score of a target object in the
pretest against the proportion of descriptions that contained
color in the production experiment (exact proportions and
typicality scores are listed in the Supplementary Materials). The
mixed model revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of color typicality
on whether a target description contained a color attribute or
not, β = −2.36, SE = 0.25, p < 0.001. The direction of the
eﬀect indicated that lower typicality in the pretest was associated
with more referring expressions containing color. An additional
analysis by means of bivariate correlation between the typicality
score of each object and the proportion of speakers mentioning
color for this object reconﬁrmed that these were signiﬁcantly
related, Pearson r(40)=−0.86, p < 0.001.
The results of our experiment warrant the conclusion that
content determination is aﬀected by the degree of typicality of
a target object’s color. When a color is more atypical for an
object, the proportion of referring expressions that include that
property increases. This eﬀect is very strong, as exempliﬁed
by the high correlation between the two variables. Figure 3
also suggests that it is highly consistent across speakers: for a
considerable number of typically colored stimuli, the percentage
of speakers not using color approaches zero, and conversely, for
some atypically colored stimuli this percentage approaches 100%.
This supports the theory that speakers evaluate contrasts with
stored knowledge about typical features of objects in long term
memory when producing a referring expression.
In Experiment 1, we have manipulated the degree of
atypicality of the target objects by using diﬀerent colors for
objects, such that the object-color combinations span a range
of atypicality scores. For example, speakers have described
blue tomatoes (very atypical), green tomatoes (not atypical nor
typical), and red tomatoes (very typical). However, target objects
in Experiment 1 were predominantly simply shaped fruits and
vegetables, i.e., objects for which color is especially instrumental
in their identiﬁcation (as their shape is not very informative about
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the identity of the objects; Tanaka and Presnell, 1999; Bramão
et al., 2011a). As explained in the theoretical background, the
diagnostic value of an object’s color in recognition is lower when
its shape is more diagnostic (Bramão et al., 2011a). Accordingly,
would color atypicality be less conspicuous when shape is more
diagnostic, resulting in a moderation of the color atypicality
eﬀect on reference production? Therefore, the goal of Experiment
2 is to investigate the eﬀect of color typicality on reference
production, as a function of objects’ shape diagnosticity.
Experiment 2: Referring to Typically and
Atypically Colored Objects with High or
Low Shape Diagnosticity
In Experiment 2, we cross color typicality with shape diagnosticity
in a language production task similar to the one used in
Experiment 1. As such, we aim to extend our ﬁndings from
the ﬁrst experiment to low-color-diagnostic objects (with more
diagnostic shapes). We expect to ﬁnd a similar relationship
between color typicality and content determination as in
Experiment 1, but because for low-color-diagnostic objects
color is less instrumental in their identiﬁcation we predict
that higher shape diagnosticity overall decreases the proportion
of referring expressions that include color. Secondly, we
predict that shape diagnosticity and color typicality interact,
such that eﬀects of color typicality are larger when shapes
are less diagnostic compared to when shapes are more
diagnostic.
Method
Participants
Sixty-two undergraduates participated for course credit. They
participated in dyads, with one participant acting as the speaker
and the other as addressee. So, there were 31 speakers (7
men, 24 women, median age 22 years, range 18-25), all were
native speakers of Dutch (the language of the study). None
of the participants took part in any of the other experiments
and pretests in this paper. They gave consent to have their
voice recorded during the experiment. Their participation was
approved by the ethical committee of our department.
Materials
High quality white-background photos of 16 target objects were
selected and edited, similar to Experiment 1, and supplemented
by stimuli used in object recognition studies. The typical color of
these objects was either red, green, yellow, or orange. Even though
the saliency algorithm we employed showed no diﬀerences
in physical salience between the ﬁve target colors used in
Experiment 1, we decided for Experiment 2 to not use blue
objects (which were all atypical in Experiment 1), and to equally
balance color frequencies throughout the experiment. As such,
the proportions of target objects in each color was kept identical
in all conditions.
Half of the objects were low in shape diagnosticity: they had
relatively simple shapes, as they were mostly round with very few
protruding parts, like in Experiment 1. The other objects were
high in shape diagnosticity, having relatively complex shapes,
comprising many protruding parts and no basic round shape (i.e.,
comprised of many geons). Such objects (e.g., lobster; see the
supplementary materials for a complete list of objects used) thus
have a more characteristic (diagnostic) shape, which sets it apart
from other object categories.
As in Experiment 1, the target objects were placed in visual
contexts of six objects. Again, the colors of these objects were
chosen such that there were three diﬀerent colors in each context,
with each color appearing on two objects. Three of the objects
were typically colored, the other three atypically colored. One of
the objects in each context was the target object, singled out by a
black square outline for the speaker. The other ﬁve objects were
the distractors. The target object was always of a unique type, so
that mentioning the target object’s color was never necessary to
disambiguate the target from any of the distractors.
Eight contexts contained objects that were low in shape
diagnosticity, and the other eight contexts contained objects high
in shape diagnosticity. Also, in half of the contexts the target
object was typically colored, and in the other half it was atypically
colored. Figure 4 presents examples of the contexts in each of
the four resulting conditions: the contexts on the left contain a
typically colored target object; in the contexts on the right the
target has an atypical color. The upper contexts comprised of
low shape diagnostic objects; the lower contexts has high shape
diagnosticity.
The target objects were subjected to an on-line judgment
task similar to the pretest in Experiment 1. Sixteen participants
took part in this task (6 men, 10 women, median age 21 years,
range 18-26; none participated in any of the other experiments
and pretests in this paper). As expected, typically colored
objects yielded a higher typicality score (range 87.50-99.75)
than atypically colored objects range 0.83-10.50). There were no
diﬀerences in typicality scores for object with a high and a low
shape diagnosticity (F < 1), and the two factors did not interact
(F < 1). The pretest also showed that none of the objects were
diﬃcult to name.
As in Experiment 1, we used the computational physical
salience estimation of Erdem and Erdem (2013) to ensure
that color typicality was not confounded with diﬀerences in
relative physical salience between typical and atypical objects, and
between objects with high and low shape diagnosticity. Analyses
of variance of the mean relative salience of the target objects
showed no diﬀerences between typically colored and atypically
colored target objects (F < 1), nor between objects with high and
low shape diagnosticity (F < 1). The two factors did not interact
(F < 1). This shows that possible (interaction) eﬀects involving
shape diagnosticity cannot be ascribed to colors being physically
more salient when for example shapes are simple and colored
areas may appear to be larger.
Procedure
Participants took part in pairs. Who was going to act as the
speaker and who as the addressee was decided by rolling a dice.
In contrast to Experiment 1, addressees were naive participants
instead of a confederate, in order to improve ecological validity
(cf. Kuhlen and Brennan, 2013). Participants were seated opposite
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FIGURE 4 | Examples of visual contexts in each of the conditions in Experiment 2, in two color typicality conditions (horizontal axis) and in two shape
diagnosticity conditions (vertical axis).
each other at a table, and each had their own computer screen.
The screens were positioned in such a way that the face of
either participant was not obstructed (ensuring that eye contact
was possible), while participants could not see each other’s
screen.
Each speaker described the target object of the sixteen visual
contexts, as well as 32 ﬁller contexts containing purple greebles.
We made two lists containing the same critical trials, but with
reversed typicality: target objects that were typically colored
for one speaker were atypically colored for another. As such,
color typicality and shape diagnosticity were manipulated within
participants, while ensuring that each target object appeared in
only one typicality condition for each participant. We did this
because one could speculate that the overall proportion of color
adjectives in Experiment 1 might inﬂate because participants
used them to express contrasts between objects of the same type
over trials. The order of the contexts in each list was randomized
for each participant, but there were always two ﬁller trials
between experimental ones (i.e., one more than in Experiment 1,
to further assure that that the colorful nature of our stimuli does
not boost the overall probability that color was mentioned; see
Koolen et al., 2013).
The addressee was presented with the same contexts as the
speaker, but without any marking of the target object. Also,
the objects on the addressee’s screen were in a diﬀerent spatial
conﬁguration than on the speaker’s screen, in line with the
instruction that it would not make sense for the speaker to
mention location information. In each trial, the addresseemarked
the picture that he or she thought the speaker was describing on
an answering sheet. Although the addressee was instructed that
clariﬁcations could be asked, there were no such requests during
the whole experiment, so the data presented here are one-shot
references.
The procedure commenced with two practice trials with
greebles, plus one practice trial with non-color-diagnostic objects
(as in Experiment 1). Once the addressee had identiﬁed a target,
this was communicated to the speaker, and a button was pressed
to advance to the next trial. The experiment ﬁnished when all
trials were described and the addressee identiﬁed the last target
object. The experiment had an average running time of about
15 min.
Research Design and Data Analysis
Data annotation was identical to Experiment 1. We analyzed
whether using a color adjective or not was related to the degree
of color atypicality of the target object using logit mixed models
(Jaeger, 2008). Initial analyses revealed that stimulus list and
stimulus order (trial number) had no eﬀects, so these factors were
left out in the following analyses. In our model, color atypicality
and shape diagnosticity were included as ﬁxed binomial factors,
standardized to reduce collinearity and to increase comparability
with Experiment 1. Participants and target object types were
included as random factors. The model had a maximal random
eﬀect structure: random intercepts and random slopes were
included for all within-participant and within-item factors, to
ensure optimal generalizability (Barr et al., 2013). Speciﬁcally,
the model contained random intercepts for participants and
target objects, random slopes for color atypicality and shape
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diagnosticity at the participant level, and a random slope for color
atypicality at the target object level.
Results and Discussion
In total, 496 target descriptions were recorded in the experiment.
472 descriptions (95%) were intelligible, unambiguous, and
contained a correct type attribute, resulting in unique reference.
Practically all analyzed descriptions were of the same form as
those in Experiment 1.
Our model revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of color atypicality on
whether a target description contained a color attribute or not,
β = 3.53, SE = 0.39, p < 0.001. Of the references to atypically
colored target objects, 75.3% contained color, compared to 14.3%
for typically colored target objects. Also, the model showed
a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of shape diagnosticity, β = −0.89,
SE= 0.35, p= 0.010. References to objects with a high diagnostic
(i.e., complex) shape contained color in 38.4% of the cases,
compared to 49.1% for low diagnostic (i.e., simple) shape target
objects. Color typicality and shape diagnosticity interacted, such
that the eﬀect of typicality on using color in a referring expression
was larger for low shape diagnostic objects than for the high shape
diagnostic objects, β = −0.70, SE = 0.32, p = 0.030. Figure 5
plots the proportion of referring expressions containing color for
each of the four conditions in the experiment.
With respect to the eﬀect of color typicality on content
determination, inspection of the data revealed that not a single
speaker acted against the general pattern and mentioned color
more often for typically colored objects than for atypically
colored ones. However, a mere three speakers mentioned color in
all atypical trials, and never mentioned color in the typical trials.
While most speakers showed more variation in their response to
color atypicality, only these three speakers show what is often
called deterministic behavior in the literature (e.g., Van Deemter
et al., 2012b).
Experiment 2 shows that the eﬀect of color typicality on
content determination is moderated by the diagnosticity of an
object’s shape. Color is more often mentioned for objects with
low shape diagnosticity. It is for these objects that the color
FIGURE 5 | The proportion of referring expressions containing color
for each of the four conditions in Experiment 2.
atypicality eﬀect is slightly larger compared to objects with higher
shape diagnosticity. This further supports the idea that object
recognition and the status of features of objects in long-term
memory is closely related to reference production.
General Discussion
We investigated the role of speakers’ stored knowledge about
objects when producing referring expression. The experiments
reported in this paper show a strong eﬀect of color atypicality on
the object properties mentioned by speakers. Speakers mention
the color of atypically colored objects signiﬁcantly more often
than when objects are typically colored, and this eﬀect is
moderated by the degree of atypicality of the color, and the
diagnosticity of the object’s shape. These results support the
view that stored knowledge about referred-to objects inﬂuences
content determination. When a property of an encountered
object contrasts with this knowledge, the probability that
this property is included in a referring expression increases
signiﬁcantly. This also suggests that because object recognition
is an integral part of reference production, there may be a close
relation between ﬁndings in object recognition related to color
diagnosticity and typicality on the one hand, and eﬀects on
reference production on the other.
Combined with the ﬁndings of Mitchell et al. (2013a), who
report similar eﬀects of atypical materials and atypical shapes
on content determination, the current paper forms converging
evidence for sizable eﬀects of atypicality on the production
of referring expressions. Furthermore, our results corroborate
Sedivy’s (2003) ﬁnding that object knowledge aﬀects content
determination, and that speakers’ decisions to encode color in a
referring expression are not taken independently of the object’s
type. Our research also resonates with Viethen et al.’s (2012)
ﬁndings on how the speciﬁc color of an object can aﬀect a
speaker’s decision to include this color in a referring expression.
While Viethen et al.’s (2012). focus on colors that are relatively
easy to name or not (e.g., blue versus light blue), we report eﬀects
of speciﬁc colors combined with speciﬁc object types.
We attribute the eﬀects of color atypicality on content
determination reported in this paper to the speakers’ visual
attention allocation, and cognitive salience in particular: because
atypical colors attract visual attention (e.g., Becker et al., 2007),
speakers tend to encode these colors in a referring expression
(e.g., Krahmer and Van Deemter, 2012). In the visual contexts
that we used, mentioning the type of the object was always
suﬃcient to fully disambiguate the target object from all the
distractors. The speakers’ decision to include color is in that sense
redundant (i.e., the referring expressions containing color are
overspeciﬁed; cf. Pechmann, 1989; Koolen et al., 2011). Instead
of carefully assessing the objects and their properties in the
visual context, and calculating their informativeness, speakers in
our experiments appeared to use other rules or mechanisms to
determine the content of a referring expression.
The idea that speakers may rely on diﬀerent content
determination processes than calculations of informativeness has
been postulated in a number of recent papers (e.g., Dale and
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Viethen, 2009; Van Deemter et al., 2012b; Viethen et al., 2012,
2014; Koolen et al., 2013). Instead of a careful consideration of
the properties and salience of all (or a subset of) the objects in a
visual context, speakers may turn to quicker, simple decision rules
to make judgments in the content determination process. Such a
decision rule that would ﬁt our data would be: “If the contrast
between the color of the target object and stored knowledge is
strong, increase the probability that it is mentioned.”
Speakers’ reliance on relatively simple decision rules is argued
to be related to the visual complexity of the contexts that they
are confronted with. Some researchers hypothesize that speakers
may especially rely on the “fast and frugal heuristics” in cases
where considering all properties of all objects in a context is
cognitively costly (e.g., Van Deemter et al., 2012b, p. 179).
However, the contexts in our experiments are undoubtedly very
simple: speakers only have to consider the type of six objects that
are presented in an uncluttered and simple environment, which
is a task that is arguably well within the speakers information
processing capacity (e.g., Miller, 1956). Yet speakers seem to
apply (a variation of) the aforementioned decision rule in
contexts with an atypically colored target. Such contexts are not
more complex or visually cluttered than the typical ones. So,
the decision rule that we propose above would not be one that
merely applies when the (limited) processing capacity of speakers
is exceeded, but one that is universally available whenever the
content of a referring expression is determined.
Implications for (Computational) Models of
Reference Production
Being able to refer to objects in a human-like manner is an
important goal for NLG models of reference production (REG
algorithms), and for the ﬁeld of NLG (a subﬁeld of Artiﬁcial
Intelligence) in general (Dale and Viethen, 2009; Frank and
Goodman, 2012; Van Deemter et al., 2012b). Our ﬁndings pose
a new challenge for current REG algorithms. In the light of our
ﬁndings, models can be enhanced by incorporating general object
knowledge, because without access to such information they are
unable to distinguish between typical and atypical objects when
determining the content of a referring expression. Moreover, in
our data, the decision to include color in a referring expression
appears not to be taken independently of the target object’s type.
For example, speakers decide to mention redness when they
describe a lemon, but not when they describe a tomato. This is
something that a model should be able to take into consideration.
Popular NLG models predict color use irrespective of
the typicality and diagnosticity of the target’s color. In the
Incremental Algorithm (IA; Dale and Reiter, 1995), attributes like
color, size, and orientation are included in a referring expression
on the basis of how informative they are, and they are considered
one by one (i.e., incrementally). More salient attributes, like
color, are considered early, because they are highly ranked in a
predeﬁned preference order (which is typically determined on the
basis of empirical data). Type is likely to be included anyway,
because it is necessary to create a proper noun phrase, and
this would yield fully distinguishing referring expressions in all
conditions in our experiments. The IA would therefore generate
no color adjectives. If the IA was to be able to make the decision
to mention the color of a yellow tomato, for example, and not
for a red tomato, it would need a ranking (preference order) of
certain colors for tomatoes (e.g., red, green, orange, yellow, blue),
instead of a mere ranking of certain attributes (e.g., color, size,
orientation).
The model of pragmatic reasoning by Frank and Goodman
(2012) allows salience of objects to be modeled for each visual
context individually (instead of in a predeﬁned preference order).
So, in eﬀect, the salience of atypically colored objects can be
modeled to be diﬀerent from the salience of typically colored
ones. However, Frank and Goodman (2012) calculate this (prior)
salience on the basis of empirical ﬁndings, so behavioral data
is needed before reference production is modeled. And while
it is well possible to estimate visual salience computationally
and automatically (e.g., Erdem and Erdem, 2013), such salience
estimations are not (yet) able to take general knowledge into
account and thus respond diﬀerently to various degrees of
atypicality.
The challenge is to feed such salience estimations with
knowledge about what prototypical colors of objects are, and how
important color is in the identity of these objects. Assuming that
object types are readily recognized computationally in a visual
context (which works quite well in controlled environments
nowadays, Andreopoulos and Tsotsos, 2013), a knowledge base
containing prototypical object information can be queried at
runtime when a referring expression is generated. This is what
Mitchell et al. (2013a) and Mitchell (2013) propose in their
discussion of repercussions of atypicality for REG. However,
for color, a simpler system without a dedicated knowledge base
may be eﬀective too. A web search for images (e.g., on Google
Images) may inform an algorithm about color typicality: when
the dominant color of the ﬁrst n image results of a web search is
computationally determined, the prototypical color of an object
should be derivable. In fact, we expect that this method can
even generate the degree of atypicality of a color, much alike the
typicality scores that we obtained in a pretest for Experiment 1.
A comparison between the n search results showing one color
and the n results showing other colors probably yields a good
estimation of the degree of atypicality of that particular color.
Our results are also interesting in the light of an observed
tendency toward using more naturalistic stimuli in behavioral
experiments that are aimed at evaluating computational models
of reference production (e.g., Coco and Keller, 2012; Viethen
et al., 2012; Clarke et al., 2013; Mitchell, 2013; Mitchell et al.,
2013a,b; Koolen et al., 2014). Color typicality may be an
important diﬀerence between artiﬁcial and more naturalistic
stimuli, as studies that employ artiﬁcial contexts often present
speakers with atypically colored objects (e.g., green television sets
and blue penguins; Koolen et al., 2013; Viethen et al., 2014). Our
results seem to argue against using artiﬁcial contexts in reference
production studies by showing that content determination can be
steadily aﬀected by atypical colors.
Color Atypicality and Speaker-Addressee
Perspectives in Reference Production
In our experiments, speakers produced referring expressions for
an addressee who was present in the communicative setting.
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Although speakers in our experiments presumably mention the
color of atypically colored target objects because atypical colors
are cognitively salient to the speakers themselves, this does not
necessarily assert that mentioning atypical colors more often than
typical ones is exclusively speaker-internal behavior (e.g., Keysar
et al., 1998; Wardlow Lane et al., 2006; Arnold, 2008). Speakers’
decisions to include color may as well be addressee-oriented and
reﬂect what is called audience design in the literature (e.g., Clark,
1996; Horton and Keysar, 1996; Arnold, 2008; Fukumura and
van Gompel, 2012). As suggested in the general introduction, if
speakers take the addressee’s perspective into account and use
their own perception as a proxy for the addressees’ (e.g., Pickering
and Garrod, 2004; Gann and Barr, 2014), they may decide to
mention the color of an atypically colored object because this is
salient to the addressees as well.
Although the face-to-face tasks in our experiments do not
oﬀer conclusive evidence in this discussion, there are reasons to
believe that overspeciﬁed atypical color attributes are beneﬁcial
for addressees. For example, a visual world study by Huettig
and Altmann (2011; Experiment 3) suggests that listeners tend
to look for objects in typical colors when this color is not
speciﬁed for them. When listeners hear a word that refers to
an object with a prototypical color (even though this color is
not mentioned), their visual attention shifts toward objects that
have this particular color. So, listeners likely beneﬁt from color
being included in a referring expression when this color is not
in line with their expectations about the object they search for.
Similar suggestions come from work in visual search, which
gives reasons to assume that listeners who are informed about
speciﬁc details of the target, such as its color, ﬁnd the target more
eﬃciently in real-world scenes (e.g., Malcolm and Henderson,
2009, 2010).
The addressed literature is less clear on how the interaction
with shape diagnosticity that we report in Experiment 2
might translate to eﬀects for addressees. As shape diagnosticity
moderates eﬀects of color atypicality on reference production,
one could speculate that a similar moderation applies to the
addressees’ task of identifying the intended target object. The
object recognition literature suggests that color is relatively less
instrumental in recognition for complex-shaped objects (e.g.,
Tanaka and Presnell, 1999; Bramão et al., 2011a), so for these
objects listeners can rely more on shape-based cues in their
visual search for the intended target object. Conversely, for
simple-shaped objects color is a relatively more useful cue for
ﬁnding these objects in a visual context (i.e., color is particularly
instrumental to ﬁnd the target in visual search). For example,
when addressees search for a tomato, redness is a more relevant
cue compared to when they search for a lobster. From this it
follows (speculatively) that being informed about the color of
the target object being atypical is more beneﬁcial for listeners
when they search for simply shaped objects, compared to when
they search for objects for which shape is more instrumental for
identifying the target. More research is needed to explore the
eﬀects of mentioning color on visual search, and interactions with
color typicality and shape diagnosticity.
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